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Abstract 
The automobile industry plays a leading role in a country’s industrialization. 
Various countries have used different methods to identify a model of industrial 
development. For developing countries, establishing the automobile industry is 
crucial for promoting industrialization. After Southeast Asian countries had 
achieved independent, their automobile industries underwent establishment and 
development stages. The domestic and overseas competitiveness of the automobile 
industries in ASEAN have received global attention. How can the industrial 
development of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines be understood? 
Researchers have proposed various views regarding the industrial development of 
these four ASEAN countries. We researched the political economy of these 
countries to understand the development of their automobile industries. 
Thailand’s automobile industry was successfully developed because of the 
government’s crucial role in implementing a coordinated market economy and 
national system of innovation. In Indonesia, government–business relations 
hampered the government’s efforts to meet society and market needs, thereby 
limiting the country’s industrialization. Malaysia must learn how to coordinate 
its industries with a market economy through liberalization and coordination. The 
Philippines has positioned its automobile industry on manufacturing automotive 
parts because of the country’s limited industrialization. Theoretically, following 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these ASEAN countries have adopted market 
economy-oriented policies; however, because of the historical context of political 
economy, the development of their automobile industries has varied. Under the 
context of globalization, the economic systems of various countries have exhibited 
low convergence. In this study, we show that embedded liberalism is the preferred 
interpretation in ASEAN automobile industry development. In other words, 
researchers should look beyond convergence theory and consider the political 
economy characteristics of various countries. Accordingly, further comparative 
research must be conducted to clarify the differences in the economic systems and 
policies in ASEAN studies.  
Keywords: Political Economy, ASEAN, Automobile Industry, 
Globalization, Embedded Liberalism 
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Introduction 
Automobile industries play a leading 
role in a country’s industrialization. 
Countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines have 
adopted various strategies in 
attempting to identify a model of 
industrial development, establish their 
automobile industry, and promote 
industrialization.    
After Southeast Asian countries 
had become independent, their 
automobile industries underwent 
establishment and development stages. 
In the twenty-first century, the domestic 
and overseas competitiveness of the 
automobile industries in Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
received global attention. According to 
Table 1, regarding the foreign trade of 
ASEAN countries between 2000 to 2010, 
vehicle exports and imports have 
increased by 47.4% and 12.4%, 
respectively. In addition, domestic trade 
in ASEAN countries has grown rapidly; 
from 2000 to 2010, the vehicle exports 
and imports increased by 77% and 94%, 
respectively. Trade growth has 
stimulated the development of various 
industries in these countries. In 
particular, in the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), tariff reduction has 
driven the prospective development of 
automobile industries in this region.        
 
Table 1 Value of vehicle imports and export in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines (2000, 2005 and2010) Unit: US$1 million 
2000 2005 2010 GROWTH RATE% 
DOMESTIC 
TRADE  
    
EXPORTS 1.06 4.88 9.22 77.0 
IMPORTS 0.80 3.98 8.33 94.1 
FOREIGN 
TRADE  
    
EXPORTS 3.33 9.10 19.1
3 
47.4 
IMPORTS 9.55 14.0
2 
21.3
6 
12.4 
DATA SOURCE: STATISTICAL DATA SETS OF 
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DES 
CONSTRUCTEURS D’AUTOMOBILES (OICA) AND WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) ABOUT VEHICLE 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS,  
HTTP://STAT.WTO.ORG/STATISTICALPROGRAM/WSDBS
TATPROGRAMTECHNOTES.ASPX?LANGUAGE=E(2015/9/1) 
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The question is which of these 
ASEAN countries has achieved the 
strongest automobile industry 
performance. Tables 2 and 3 show the 
performance of automobile businesses 
in four ASEAN countries for the 1990 to 
2010 period. The tables show that 
Thailand, with Japan as a foreign 
investor, has demonstrated the 
strongest performance in trade and 
production among these four ASEAN 
countries. Although Malaysia’s trade 
transactions have been less than 
Thailand’s and Indonesia’s, Malaysia is 
the only country among these four 
countries to own a local automobile 
brand. Indonesia intends to follow 
Thailand’s model of liberalizing 
automobile businesses; in addition, 
Indonesia has attempted to establish its 
national brand. Regardless of 
production or trade imports and exports, 
Indonesia’s automobile industry is 
weaker than that of Thailand and 
Malaysia. The Philippines does not have 
a clear goal for industrial development, 
and its production and trade volumes 
are less than those of the other three 
countries are.  
 
 
 
Table 2 Value of automobile manufacturing and vehicle imports and exports in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (1990–2010) 
Unit: US$1 million 
 
 
 
Trade growth rate (%) Trade value 
    1990 1995 2000 2010 1990-2000 2000-10 1990-95 1995-2010 
Thailand 
Exports 0.11 0.49 2.42 18.7 210 67.3 69.1 247.8 
Imports 2.65 5.18 2.08 8.54 -2.2 31.1 19.1 4.3 
Malaysia 
Exports 0.12 0.28 0.31 1.33 15.8 32.9 26.7 25 
Imports 1.31 2.79 1.83 5.76 4 21.5 22.6 7.1 
Indonesia 
Exports 0.02 0.13 0.37 2.55 175 58.9 110 124.1 
Imports 1.52 3.14 1.87 5.56 2.3 45.6 21.3 5.1 
The 
Philippines 
Exports 0.02 0.22 0.58 1.82 280 21.3 200 48.5 
Imports 0.54 1.54 0.97 2.57 8 16.5 37 4.5 
Source: Statistical data sets of OICA and WTO about vehicle imports and exports,  
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramTechNotes.aspx?Language=E(2015/9/1) 
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Table 3 Production and manufacturing in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines (1980–1995 and 1995–2010) 
Unit: US$1 million 
 Year Growth rate (%) 
1980 1995 2010 2014 1980-95 1995-2010 2010-2014 
Malaysia  
Sales 
9,762 285,792 605,156 666,465 12.9 7.4 30.5 
    
Production 
104,227 288,338 567,715 596,600 11.8 6.4 14.37 
Thailand  
Sales 
89,201 547,758 800,357 881,832 34.3 3.1 40.53 
Production 73,985 525,680 1,644,513 1,880,007 40.7 14.2 117.16 
Indonesia 
Sales 
212,000 384,000 764,710 1,208,019      6.6 220.55 
Production 174,700 388,000 702,508 1,298,523 8.1 5.4 296.52 
The 
Philippines 
Sales  
70,000 128,162 170,216 296,492       2.2 62.82 
Production 41,900 127,016 65,625 - 13.5 -3.2 - 
 Source: Richard F. Doner and P. Wad, ‚Financial Crises and Automotive Industry 
Development in Southeast Asia‛, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 44, No. 4(2014), p. 
668. 
 
Because of the automobile industry 
in guiding economic development and 
industrialization, these four ASEAN 
countries hope that developing their 
automobile industries can facilitate 
industrial development; however, 
differences in the political and economic 
history, as well as the development of 
industry in these four countries, have 
led to varying results. How can the 
development of the automobile 
industries in these four ASEAN 
countries be understood? Do such 
developments have political and 
economic implications?    
Previous studies have considered 
the industrial development of ASEAN 
countries as a whole. Researchers who 
advocate neoclassical economics 
consider that national industry typically 
develop according to their comparative 
advantage; also, market competition  
 
should be encouraged, and economic 
rationality should be adopted to 
optimize resources allocation (Balassa 
1982; Bhagwati 1988, pp. 25-27). Scholar 
has even proposed a slogan‛ The End of 
History‛ (Fukuyama 1992). 
However, neoclassical economics 
has fueled much discussion (Chu 2001, 
67). Some researchers have indicated 
that slow economic development is 
related to market and international 
factors; economic development in 
developing countries has not been 
based on the principles of a free market 
(Zysman 1995, pp. 1-3; Doherty 1995, pp. 
1-3; Jomo 2007, pp. 461-508). For 
example, regarding the concept of 
developmental state proposed by Japan, 
Johnson considered that the rapid 
development of East Asian countries 
after World War II was related to these 
countries’ strenuous efforts to improve 
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their economy (Johnson 1982; Kumon 
1972, pp. 109-141; Rosovsky 1972, pp. 
109-141). In addition to the theory of 
developmental state, dependency 
theory and dependency development 
theory(Doner 1991; Jenkins 1991, pp. 
625-645), structure theory(Crouch 1986; 
Robison 1992; Robison 1986), 
institutional theory(Chang 1994), and 
government–business 
relations(Laothamatas 1992; Maclntyre 
1991; Haggared 1998, pp. 78-104) differ 
substantially from neoclassical 
economics (these are referred to as the 
development school of economics 
hereafter).                    
Since the 2000s, international 
systems have developed a division of 
labor system in global production and 
manufacturing; consequently, 
developing countries have faced 
problems with industrial liberalization 
and protection removal(Wade 2003, pp.  
621-644). These theoretical debates have 
overlooked the specific historical 
conditions and issues about global 
industrial innovation (Hill 2004, pp. 
354-394). In addition, the development 
model for East Asian countries does not 
necessarily suit Southeast Asian 
countries (Jomo 2007A; Jomo 2000B; 
Stiglitz and Yusof 2001). In reality, since 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 
political and economic environments of 
Southeast Asian countries have changed 
substantially. The aforementioned 
theoretical debates are mostly focused 
on the pre-financial crisis period and do 
not provide a comprehensive 
comparison. These theoretical 
limitations should be viewed from a 
different research perspective.       
In the present paper, the long-term 
strategies of Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines in 
developing their automobile industries 
are analyzed and summarized. First, the 
political and economic characteristics of 
each country are analyzed from the 
perspective of the development of each 
country’s automobile industry 
specifically between 1960 and 1997 
(when the Asian financial crisis 
occurred). This period is referred to as 
the period of globalization (Doner and 
Wad 2014, pp. 664-687).2 Second, how 
the automobile industries in these four 
ASEAN countries adapted to 
globalization is discussed. Finally, we 
offer a conclusion by our analysis.       
The Political Economy Background of 
the Automobile Industry in ASEAN: 
the State, Government–Business 
Relations and Foreign Investment 
1. The State 
A. Malaysia 
Malaysia appears to be a successful 
case that follows the development 
school of economics. After an incident 
of political violence on May 13, 1969, 
which occurred following the 1969 
election, the state led by Malays 
adopted a new economic policy 
promoting industrialization as a 
                                                 
2
 The beginning of globalization typically 
refers to the year of 1994 when WTO was 
founded. In this study, the 1997 financial 
crisis was used as a cutoff point because of 
the following considerations: (a) The 
financial crisis forced various countries to 
adjust their industrial policies. (b) After the 
financial crisis, ASEAN countries began to 
transform their political and economic 
structures. (c) After the financial crisis, the 
ASEAN announced the 1999 Hanoi 
Declaration in declaring that ASEAN 
countries would intensively integrate the 
region and accelerate trade liberalization. 
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characteristic of Malaysia’s industrial 
development. The new economic policy 
not only changed the political and 
economic structure of Malaysia during 
its early independence period but also 
depoliticized the economic structure 
through legalized economic 
development (Tan 1992,pp. 208-305). 
The government implemented an 
economic policy to enable national 
power to influence various social classes; 
the Malay government regulated 
economic development to maintain its 
ruling power ( Ho 1988).   
In the 1990s, Malaysia’s 
longest-serving prime minister, 
Mahathir bin Mohamad, promoted 
heavy industrialization to stimulate the 
national economy. Mohamad assisted 
the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia in developing and 
implementing national heavy industrial 
projects and the Industrial Master Plan 
(IMP) to stimulate domestic automobile 
production. Mohamad intended to 
improve the situation in which most 
businesses were owned by Chinese 
capitalists. Through industrial 
adjustment (i.e., the plan to 
manufacture domestic vehicles), 
Malaysia’s social structure was 
reorganized; the automobile industry 
was transformed from a parts assembler 
to an exporter of domestic vehicles. 
Since then, the automobile industry was 
considered as Malaysia’s most strategic 
industry, which was crucial for 
achieving the 2020 target of establishing 
a national car brand in Malaysia.                
Under the new political-economy 
structure, Malaysia created the only 
national car brand (i.e., Proton; 
Perusahaan otomotif) in ASEAN countries. 
Through the creation of a national 
brand, Proton covered approximately 
45% of the domestic market. In 1997, 
Proton acquired British Lotus Cars. 
Before this, a second domestic car 
company, Perodua, was founded in 
October 1992 and received considerable 
national support. This company created 
a large-scale vehicle parts market. In the 
1990 period, Proton Cars had 350 
suppliers, had invested MYR4.6 billion, 
and employed 30,000 people.3 
Malaysia continued to protect the 
automobile industry but did not 
consider whether the industry was 
adequately self-reliant. In addition, 
related manufacturers relied heavily on 
the government and required national 
protection because domestic cars did 
not incline to minimize their costs. 
Woo-Cumings argued that industries 
that rely on national protection and do 
not seek industrial transformation are 
indicative of crony capitalism; moreover, 
countries that provide national 
protection to certain industries are not 
in an East Asian developmental state 
(Woo-Cumings 1999, pp. 1-31).  
B. Indonesia 
Among the four ASEAN countries 
discussed in this paper, Indonesia was 
the first to develop its automobile 
industry. In 1929, General Motors 
founded the first assembly factory in 
Java. Indonesia had a large domestic 
market and excellent advantages over 
industrial development.  
When Indonesia achieved 
independence, the country’s first 
president, Sukarno, implemented 
nationalization and localization (Pribumi) 
                                                 
3  ‚How is the automobile industry in 
Malaysia?‛ in China Automobile News, June 3, 
2002, the third section  
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policies on the basis of economic 
nationalism and confiscated enterprises 
originally owned by former colonists 
(Soong 1996, pp. 279-282). After 
National Vehicle Indonesia Service 
Company was founded, the automobile 
industry became crucial for promoting 
economic nationalism and establishing 
an aboriginal capital. During the New 
Order period after 1965, the automobile 
industry alternated between 
protectionism and the free market; no 
complete industrial plan was 
developed.    
As Malaysia developed its plan for 
promoting domestic automobiles, 
Indonesia began to promote a similar 
plan in 1994 because of economic 
nationalism. In contrast to Malaysia, 
Indonesia’s plan was not aimed at 
heavily industrializing Indonesia, but to 
justify the corruptive behavior of the 
Suharto family. Various WTO member 
countries complained about the 
domestic automobile plan; in addition, 
because of a proviso for assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
Indonesia’s automobile market became 
an open market.       
Regarding Malaysia’s 
government-led industrial development, 
some researchers have analyzed the 
government’s determination to develop 
an industry on the basis of the will to 
develop, and Malaysia and Indonesia 
plans to promote their domestic vehicle 
markets have been compared from this 
perspective. The goal of Malaysia’s 
automobile industry was clear: to 
develop a national brand through 
national protection in order to establish 
national confidence, which served as a 
basis for formulating industrial and 
trade policies. For example, import 
permits, tariff protections, and national 
investment were promoted to 
encourage industrial development (Tai 
2008,53-76). Enterprises were supported 
with national resources, thereby 
facilitating developing international 
brands (Chu 2011, p.  248). 
Malaysia endeavored to develop its 
national brand; however, Suharto’s 
slogan ‚developing a national economy‛ 
was aimed at benefiting Suharto’s 
personal interests. During the New 
Order period, automobile policies in 
Indonesia alternated between open a 
market economy and nationalism. This 
is why the foundation of the automobile 
industry in Indonesia was not as solid 
as that in Malaysia.     
D. The Philippines 
In the 1950s, the Philippines were 
an economic power in Asia and had a 
large domestic market, which served as 
an excellent foundation for industrial 
development. On July 4, 1946, the 
Philippines achieved independence 
from the United States. The Roxas, 
Quirino, Magasaysay, Garcia, 
Macapagal, and Marcos (who became 
the president in 1965) administrations 
had adopted an import substitution 
strategy to protect national industries, 
enhance the industrialization level, and 
reduce import dependency. Because of 
this strategy, the Philippines’ economy 
was the fastest growing in Southeast 
Asia, and its industries developed 
successfully in the early period of 
independence.4  
                                                 
4 In East Asia, the level if industrialization 
in the Philippines in 1950 was second only 
to Japan.  
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The Philippines began to develop 
its automobile industry in 1960; 
subsequently, the country continued to 
implement new policies. In the 1980s, 
local automobile businesses closed 
down because of foreign exchange crisis 
when happening in 1983. At the end of 
the Marcos era, the government could 
not control the used vehicle imports, 
which had a negative influence on local 
automobile businesses. In brief, the 
Philippines did not take issues related 
to the automobile industry seriously, 
and local automobile businesses became 
uncompetitive because of the import 
substitution strategy. Although local 
automobile businesses strived for 
success, the industry exhibited slow 
growth because of the limited size of the 
domestic automobile market and 
overproduction. The sales volume of 
used vehicles was more than twice that 
of new vehicles. Accordingly, 
multinational companies were 
discouraged from investing in 
establishing factories in the Philippines 
(Xu 2012).5     
The Philippines appears to have 
missed its opportunity to develop an 
automobile industry. When other 
Southeast Asian countries actively 
promoted an export orientation for their 
automobile industries in the 1980s, local 
capitalists in the Philippines controlled 
the economy and the import 
substitution strategy, which researchers 
have referred to as ‚booty capitalism,‛ 
limited the country’s industrial 
transformation (Hutchcroft 1998). 
                                                 
5  Ford Motor Company closed down its 
factories in the Philippines at the end of 
2012. 
Ford Motor Company indicated that its 
factories closed down because of no supply 
for automobile parts and no cluster effect.  
Because of the limitations of a local 
capitalistic structure, the Philippines 
were unsuccessful in implementing its 
proposed industrial policies.  
D. Thailand 
Similar to the Philippines, Thailand 
was a weak country with a strong sense 
of community (Doner 1988, p. 1561). 
Although the Thai government was a 
military-led government, the 
government did not have strong control 
in leading its industries because of 
frequent coups.    
In 1980, Prem Tinsulanonda gained 
support from the military and civilians 
and became the country’s prime 
minister, and Thailand’s political 
situation was relatively stable for the 
next eight years. In 1988, Chatichai 
Choonhave, a scholar, became the prime 
minister and led Thailand in 
transforming a war-torn region into a 
commercial market (Bunbongkarn 1996, 
p. 27). At the end of the Cold War, like 
other countries, Thailand considered 
economic development crucial and 
formulated economic development 
strategies. After the country had 
democratized, businesses began 
sending representatives to political 
parties, the parliament, and the cabinet, 
and these lobbyists became involved in 
political decision making. In contrast to 
Suharto in Indonesia, Mohamad in 
Malaysia, and Marcos in the Philippines, 
Thailand’s political leaders did not have 
highly centralized leadership structure 
(Doner 1988,p. 1561). Because of this 
special structure, Thailand’s industrial 
policies were oriented toward liberal 
corporatism (Laothamatas 1992).    
The government of Thailand 
continued to influence the country’s 
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domestic automobile industry. Latin 
American countries relied on foreign 
investment to develop their economy; 
accordingly, many businesses were 
forced to merge with or were acquired 
by multinational companies (Amsden 
2003). In Thailand, local capitalists were 
responsible for production and learning; 
consequently, were counter to the 
prediction of dependency theory. As 
indicated by Doner, although 
Thailand’s industrial policies were 
effective in attracting foreign 
investment and supported the 
connection between multinational 
companies and local capitalists in the 
1980s, the government maintained its 
independence and assisted with the 
communication between local capitalists 
and multinational companies to expand 
the market and improve technology 
(Doner 1988, p. 1561). The private sector 
played a crucial role in Thailand’s 
industrialization, with the government 
acting as a facilitator (Ikemto 1992, p. 
172). 
2. Government–Business Relations 
A. Malaysia 
Government–business relations in 
Malaysia and Indonesia influenced the 
development of their automobile 
industries. In Malaysia, such 
relationships mainly benefited specific 
ethnic and racial groups. According to 
the new economic policies implemented 
by the Mohammad administration, 
protecting the automobile industry was 
imperative to protect the interests of 
various ethnic groups.6 Regarding the 
                                                 
6 Before Proton was founded, Japan-based 
car manufacturing groups and Chinese 
people had majority control over the 
automobile assembly industry; Malays sold 
ownership structure of Proton, most 
shareholders were Malay business 
groups.7 To protect their interests, the 
social benefits of the domestic car plan 
were considered more crucial than the 
profits gained by businesses. Therefore, 
although the management of domestic 
car businesses was unsatisfactory, the 
government continued to assist 
domestic car manufacturers.    
Automobile businesses in Malaysia 
were notorious for the approved-permit 
system. In Malaysia, all vehicle imports 
required an approved permit. This 
system was implemented to protect 
assembly factories in Malaysia and to 
enable Malay enterprises to import and 
sell vehicles. Holding an approved 
permit was equivalent to having a quota 
of vehicle imports; accordingly, an 
approved permit meant a profitable 
privilege. Malaysia Sin Chew Daily 
reported on enterprises that had 
obtained an approved permit through 
their favorable relations with the 
government.8 The protective industrial 
                                                                   
cars only for downstream businesses. 
However, after the domestic car plan was 
developed, the structure of share ownership 
changed. Regardless of the new economic 
policy or national heavy industrial plan, 
automobile businesses and related 
automobile parts businesses were required 
to meet national requirements and to 
encourage Malays to invest.   
7  For information on the ownership 
structure of Proton, please refer to ‚A 
political and economic analysis of 
rent-seeking theory and the automobile 
industry in Malaysia‛ by Dai, W. P., 
published in Chinese Association of Political 
Science in September 2007 at the Department 
of Public Policy and Management, I-Shou 
University, Kaohsiung.     
8  Malaysia Sin Chew Daily listed ten 
enterprises that held an approved permit in 
2005.  
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policy became one of political 
favoritism related to the allocation of 
profits.       
B. Indonesia 
The relationship between each 
former president in Indonesia and 
businesses influenced the development 
of its automobile industry. Since the 
1950s, the national automobile assembly 
factory led by the government was 
highly powerful; the person in charge 
was called the king of cars and 
maintained a close relationship with 
Sukarno. The main job of all automobile 
manufacturers was to obtain 
distribution rights for import vehicle 
licenses(Chalmerd 1994, 17); capitalists 
were relatively unconcerned about 
production technology(Hansen 1971, 
57-58). To protect corporate interests, 
most companies established favorable 
relations with Suharto. Many 
companies with excellent government–
business relations cooperated with 
Japan and had their products included 
in the government’s protection list 
(Chalmer 1994, pp. 25). In brief, the 
industrial policy related to the 
reduction plan appeared to facilitate the 
development of local automobile 
businesses; however, this policy was the 
ruler’s excuse to develop government–
business relations (Chalmer 1994, 25). 
Another example was that Suharto 
proposed the pioneer program in 1996. 
According to this program, the 
government could grant the status of 
‚pioneer‛ to local companies whose 
capital, equipment, and technology 
achieved a certain standard; in addition, 
                                                                   
http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/aplist/ind
ex.phtml?sec=723&artid=200507190274(2007
/3/31) 
these companies were exempted from 
consumption taxes and import tariffs. 
However, this program was revealed to 
be protecting a company owned by 
Tommy Suharto, the son of President 
Suharto. The industrial structure was 
determined by government–business 
relations and thus could not be 
improved. Researchers have considered 
Indonesia’s automobile industry an 
unindustrialized industry(Aswicahyono 
2000, pp. 209-241). 
C. Thailand 
In Thailand, government–business 
relations were crucial (Chen 2008). 
However, government–business 
relations had no influence on the 
automobile industry. The reason is that 
Chinese businesspersons in Thailand 
did not pay much attention to industries 
related to automobile manufacturing.9 
D. The Philippines 
Former leaders of the Philippines 
announced plans to develop the 
country’s automobile industry; however, 
their attempts were unsuccessful. Other 
East Asian countries had adopted an 
import substitution strategy to protect 
their manufacturing industries, as well 
as export discipline to force the 
manufacturing industry to sell domestic 
products and increase its international 
competitiveness (Studwell 2014). The 
Philippines should have followed other 
East Asian countries in capitalizing on 
the opportunity to transform the import 
substitution strategy into an 
                                                 
9  Chia Tai Group in Thailand did not 
cooperate with Faw-Volkswagen 
Automotive Co. Ltd in Shanghai, China, in 
producing MG cars (a British brand) in 
Thailand until 2014. 
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export-orientation strategy. However, 
local capitalists in the Philippines (e.g., 
landlords, urban elites, and Chinese 
businesspeople) focused on the import 
substitution strategy and had no 
intention of transforming their focus 
from agricultural production to 
industrial manufacturing; the 
government lacked the capital to lead 
heavy industrialization. Such political 
and business structures hindered 
industrial progress in the Philippines.      
3. Foreign Investment 
A. Malaysia 
To manufacture cars, the heavy 
industry group in Malaysia chose to 
cooperate with Mitsubishi Motors and 
limited other foreign investment. 
However, in the late 1990s, the 
automobile industry in Malaysia began 
to decline (Wade 2003,p. 8) because it 
did not cooperate with foreign investors 
or be linked with international 
businesses. Although the Tan Chong 
Group cooperated with foreign 
investors to assemble Nissan and 
Renault cars, the government controlled 
the development of the automobile 
industry. Rosli and Kari found that 
under national protection, local 
manufacturers and automobile parts 
businesses had no opportunity to 
communicate with international 
assembly factories, resulting in 
automobile businesses in Malaysia 
becoming uncompetitive(Rosli and Kari 
2008,103-118). 
B. Indonesia 
During the New Order period, 
Japanese automotive 
MNCs(Multinational Enterprises) 
injected capital into local businesses (i.e., 
Chinese businesses) to evade policy 
controls and operate in Indonesia. The 
Astra Group leveraged its relations with 
Suharto to obtain a license under the 
guise of promoting local business. 
However, the assembly factory was a 
joint venture of Astra Group and 
Toyota(Chalmers 1996, 31; Audet and 
VanGrasstek 1997,pp. 220-221). Japanese 
automobile manufacturers cooperated 
with local automobile manufacturers to 
expand the overseas market, which is 
why Japanese MNCs continued to 
monopolize Indonesia’s automobile 
industry.10     
C. Thailand 
Thailand is willing to cooperate 
with MNCs and is an example of 
development-by-invitation. Thailand’s 
automobile industry began developing 
at the later stage of the development of 
the ASEAN automobile industry. 
However, Thailand was not under 
pressure to remove a colonial economy. 
When the Plaza Accord in 1985 forced 
the Japanese yen to appreciate against 
the US dollar, Japanese automakers 
were forced to move overseas to 
minimize production costs; Thailand 
became the first investment choice for 
Japanese MNCs (Rasiah 1999; Lim 
2006,p. 8). Through cooperation with 
foreign investment, a specialized supply 
chain system formed in Thailand’s 
domestic automobile manufacturing 
industry. Researchers have argued that 
this be why Thailand became the hub of 
Southeast Asia’s automobile 
manufacturing industry(Kohpaiboon 
2007,p. 8). Because of large investment 
                                                 
10 For information on how local funds and 
foreign capital were jointly used to acquire 
the government’s protection during this 
period, please refer to Chalmers (1996). 
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projects, the manufacturing growth rate 
in Thailand between 1990 and 1994 was 
ranked highest in the world (Fujita 1998, 
p. 154). 
Despite the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, Thailand did not limit the level of 
foreign investment. Conversely, the 
1999 Foreign Business Act promoted 
foreign investment and allowed foreign 
investors to hold 100% of shares in 
subsidiary companies in Thailand. In 
addition, foreign investors were 
encouraged to purchase factories on the 
verge of bankruptcy. This approach 
solved the overcapacity problem caused 
by the shrinking domestic market 
through increasing exports. In addition, 
liberalization measures allowed foreign 
investors to gain profits rapidly; 
accordingly, foreign investors were very 
willing to enter Thailand’s market. 
D. The Philippines 
Among the four ASEAN countries, 
the Philippines were the least active in 
utilizing foreign investment. During the 
Marcos era, the Philippines attempted 
to use foreign resources to develop its 
national economy and borrow funds 
from the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank. In the 1980s, the 
Philippines founded the Board of 
Investment to attract foreign investment. 
However, the purpose of foreign 
investors was mainly to finance 
domestic capitalists rather than facilitate 
industrialization through what 
dependency theory refers to as a triple 
alliance. Marcos often purchased and 
nationalized large enterprises in the 
name of national development, which 
was a deterrent to foreign investment.    
At the end of Marcos’ presidency, 
the import substitution policy remained 
in effect; in addition, the United States 
dominated the market; accordingly, 
because of a lack of funds, the 
Philippines had to loan funds from 
other countries (Bello, Guzman and 
Malig  2004). The Philippines was 
under considerable pressure because 
the country accumulated a large 
amount of foreign debt and was, 
therefore, unable to invest in basic 
industries. When the Philippines’ 
foreign debt became high, Japan 
relocated its automobile industry to 
Thailand. Compared with Thailand, the 
political situation in the Philippines was 
more unstable, and the economic 
market exhibited slower growth.           
Adjustment and Transformation of 
ASEAN Automobile Industry under 
the Global Framework 
In 1990, ASEAN countries were 
confronted with globalization and 
regional integration. Because MNCs 
encouraged cross-border investment 
and world trade had grown 
substantially, the industrial structure in 
various countries changed considerably. 
Cooperation among automobile 
businesses was an essential item in the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme. 
When the AEC was formed in 2015, 
international automobile manufacturers 
restructured their businesses globally. 
Determining how to develop industries 
in various countries has been a 
considerable challenge. The question is 
how did these four ASEAN countries 
systematically adjust their markets 
worldwide?   
(1) Malaysia 
Among the four ASEAN countries, 
Malaysia’s automobile industry was the 
most protected (Wad and Govindaraju 
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2011,pp 152-171).11 The success of the 
automobile industry in Malaysia at the 
early stage was largely due to the 
protection policy. Resistance to 
industrial liberalization had a strong 
influence on industrial liberalization. 
Malaysia proposed the Malaysian 
Scenario and temporarily excluded 
automobile assembly and vehicle 
imports from common effective 
preferential tariffs (CEPT) without 
removing tariff protection mechanisms. 
Malaysia continued to leverage an 
excise duty and therefore violated the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.12        
Using approved permits to restrain 
automotive imports is considered a 
violation of free trade. The facilitator of 
industrialization in Malaysia, Datuk 
Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad, who was a 
consultant for Proton, followed 
economic nationalism and refused to 
cancel the approved-permit system. 13 
To confront liberalization, the 
development of Malaysia’s automobile 
industry was focused on political 
considerations instead of economic 
benefits (Doner and Wad 2014,pp.  
                                                 
11 Wad described the automobile industry 
in Malaysia as an unwilling liberalizer (Wad 
and Govindaraju 2011). 
12 In 2007, negotiations between the United 
States and Malaysia regarding FTAs and 
auto tariffs were a crucial subject. US 
automobile manufacturers hoped to 
manufacture cars in Malaysia. Malaysia 
imposed a 10% import duty and 80%–200% 
excise duty on cars imported from 
non-ASEAN countries. The United States 
hoped that Malaysia would cancel these 
types of taxes.        
13 http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/aplist/i
ndex.phtml?sec=723&artid=200510142558
（2006/11/20） 
681-682). 14  The protection policy 
facilitated developing the automobile 
industry and promoting resource 
centralization, but failed to promote 
innovation in Malaysia’s domestic 
automobile industry. High costs and the 
small scale of businesses resulted in 
inefficient resource allocation. Industrial 
survival and preventing foreign cars 
from dominating domestic markets 
were driven by political and economic 
interests; consequently, reforms could 
only be achieved at a slow pace.        
(2) Indonesia 
After the 1997 financial crisis, the 
IMF required all interventionist 
industrial policies to be discontinued 
before it would provide economic 
assistance(Nag, Banerjee and Chatterjee 
2007, p. 26 and p. 41). Accordingly, 
recent industrial developments have 
been focused on market liberalization. 
In 1999, Indonesia proposed the 1999 
Automotive Policy Package, signed the 
Trade and Investment-Related 
Guidelines, and incorporated the 
automobile industry in the Inclusion 
List of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement to 
reduce tariffs on vehicle imports. In 
2002, the CEPT was imposed, and 
vehicle import tariffs were lowered to 
less than 5%. Among the ASEAN 
countries, Indonesia’s market was 
liberalized the most rapidly. Because of 
market liberalization and domestic 
demand, manufacturers from various 
countries worldwide entered 
Indonesia’s automotive market, creating 
                                                 
14 Certain researchers have considered that, 
compared with Thailand, Malaysia has 
abundant natural resources to back national 
income, protect Malays’ interests, and 
withstand the financial pressure to a higher 
degree. 
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an inflow of foreign investment. Since 
2013, the automobile industry has 
attracted a large amount of foreign 
investment, accounting for 25% of all 
foreign investment in Indonesia.15      
Despite the high domestic demand 
and increasing foreign investment, 
knowledge and production technologies 
in automobile manufacturing were 
outdated(Banerjee and Chatterjee 2007, 
26). MNCs were focused on exploiting 
the domestic market rather than 
developing a regional research and 
development (R&D) center. Japanese 
MNCs factories controlled automotive 
parts production and local companies 
only provided automotive parts 
according to contracts. Critical 
automotive parts were typically 
imported, rendering industrial 
development stagnant. Compared with 
in Thailand, the performance of 
Indonesia’s automobile industry was 
unsatisfactory and failed to meet the 
standards of the international market. 
Consequently, the automobile industry 
in Indonesia was completely knocked 
down and lacked international 
competitiveness (Soejachmoen 2011,pp.  
41-42). 
(3) Thailand 
The financial crisis crippled 
Thailand’s automobile industry, 
resulting in an abrupt drop in market 
demand, and the government of 
Thailand chose to continue with its 
liberation policy. After the 1997 
financial crisis, Thailand allowed 
foreign investors to hold 100% of shares 
                                                 
15 Refer to Indonesia Investment 
Coordinating Board (BKPM) website of 
Indonesia’s National Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www7.bkpm.go.id/(2014/11/28) 
of subsidiary companies in Thailand. 
Major multinational companies 
gradually selected Thailand as their 
automobile production base. They 
adopted several industrial strategies.     
First, in 1998, one 5-year economic 
development plan was formulated with 
the objective of transforming Thailand’s 
automobile industry into the 
automobile manufacturing center of 
Asia and using domestic supply chains 
to enhance the benefit of automobiles.16 
Second, during the 1997 financial crisis, 
many of Thailand’s automobile parts 
factories were on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The 1999 Foreign Business 
Act promoted foreign investment, 
allowed foreign investors to hold 100% 
of shares of subsidiary companies in 
Thailand, and motivated foreign 
companies to acquire factories facing 
bankruptcy. Third, multinational 
companies with sole proprietorship 
were founded. 17  Fourth, the domestic 
manufacturing system was specialized, 
with foreign investors controlling 
assembly companies and local 
capitalists supplying parts (Office of 
Industrial Economics 2006, p. 19). Also, 
according to the Free Trade Agreement 
among Thailand, Australia, New 
Zealand, and India, taxes on automotive 
parts were reduced; automotive parts 
                                                 
16  ‚Master Plan for Thai Automotive 
Industry,‛ refer to 
http://www.oie.go.th/policy7/Mplan/Auto/
MP_Ex_Auto_en.pdf。(2010/08/01) 
17 To join the WTO, Thailand had to sign 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs). According to the TRIMs, 
the automotive market should cancel the 
origin requirements and allow a 5-year 
grace period for developing countries. 
According to this timeframe, Thailand 
began to relax its origin requirements in 
1997 and lifted them in 2000.    
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were included in the negotiation list for 
the bilateral free trade agreement 
between Thailand and China.18 In 2008, 
Thailand proposed the Vision 2020 
solution, which included the automobile 
industry in the investment promotion 
program for the five major industries, to 
attract foreign investors.      
(4) The Philippines 
Because of the financial crisis, 
domestic consumer markets in the 
Philippines began to decline, 
automobile assembly factories began to 
downsize, and the automobile 
manufacturing industry entered a 
slump. In 2002, the government 
proposed the motor vehicle 
development program to reduce taxes 
and attract investment, hoping to 
promote Philippine brand vehicles 
(Trade Union Congress of the 
Philippine 2014). Subsequently, 
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III 
proposed the Philippine Manufacturing 
Industry Roadmap, which was aimed at 
industrializing the automobile industry, 
and called his goals ‚Vision 2022‛ in an 
attempt to solve the problem of 
Filipinos seeking job opportunities 
overseas by providing job opportunities 
in the domestic manufacturing industry. 
A lack of foreign investment 
hindered industry localization. When 
international automobile manufacturers 
restructured their global deployment of 
businesses, the automobile industry in 
the Philippines was marginalized 
because of manufacturers establishing 
their factories in emerging countries 
                                                 
18  ‚Master Plan for Thai Automotive 
Industry,‛ refer to 
http://www.oie.go.th/policy7/Mplan/Auto/
MP_Ex_Auto_en.pdf(2015/08/01) 
and entering markets in various 
countries through their huge factory 
capacity, cost advantage, and trade 
liberalization. Accordingly, imported 
cars became cheaper than domestic cars, 
thereby reducing domestic industrial 
competitiveness. 19  In response to the 
integration of regional economy, 
multinational companies concentrated 
their production bases in Thailand and 
closed down their factories in the 
Philippines. Only Ford Motor Company 
attempted to establish an automobile 
manufacturing center in the Philippines; 
however, they eventually closed down 
their production line. The Philippines 
failed under the framework of free 
trade.      
 (5) Investment Strategies of 
MNCs in ASEAN 
According to ASEAN Brochures 
published by the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (JAMA), 
Thailand was the first choice for Japan 
to transfer its technology and to develop 
human resource training programs. In 
recent years, Indonesia has also 
attracted human resource training plans 
but lacked technology transfer. In 
                                                 
19  Philippine Automotive Competitiveness 
Council compared the costs of vehicles 
manufactured in Thailand and the 
Philippines: the assembly costs in The 
Philippines (16%) were higher than those in 
Thailand (13%); 49% and 23% of automotive 
parts were produced in Thailand and the 
Philippines, respectively; the production 
costs in Thailand was lower than those in 
the Philippines by 14%. Refer to PACCI, 
‚Expectations and Aspirations of the 
Philippine Automotive Manufacturing 
Industry‛, 
http://pacci.ph/expectations-and-aspirations
-of-the-philippine-automotive-manufacturin
g-industry/(2014/2/20) 
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Malaysia, certain foreign manufacturers 
have transferred their technology to 
local manufacturers because of 
Malaysia’s independent development 
strategy. Japanese MNCs did not 
transfer their technology or develop 
human resource training plans in the 
Philippines (Table 5).       
Table 5 Japanese MNCs technology transfer and human resource training 
programs in the automobile industry of ASEAN countries (post-2005)  
 Technology transfer Manpower training 
2005   Toyota: Thailand 
2006   Nissan: All ASEAN countries 
2007  Honda: The Philippines 
 Nissan: Thailand 
 Honda: Malaysia 
2008  Mitsubishi: Malaysia  Nissan: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
 Fuji heavy industry: Singapore 
2009   Toyota: Thailand 
2010  Isuzu: Thailand   Nissan: Indonesia 
2012  Daihatsu: Indonesia   Daihatsu: Indonesia  
2013  Daihatsu: Malaysia  Honda: All ASEAN countries 
 Mitsubishi: The Philippines  
 Suzuki: Indonesia 
 Toyota: The Philippines  
 Toyota: Thailand  
2014  Mitsubishi: Thailand  Mitsubishi: The Philippines  
 Toyota: Indonesia  
Source: ASEAN Brochures published by the JAMA, refer to  
http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html (2015/9/10) 
According to Table 6, between 2010 
and 2014, investment events in the 
region mainly occurred in Thailand and 
Indonesia. Indonesia accepted both 
factory investment and technology 
investment, and hence its domestic 
market attracted Japanese MNCs. 
Comparatively, the Philippines were 
disadvantaged.   
 
Table 6 Major investments by Japanese MNCs in ASEAN countries (2010–2014) 
Unit: the number of cases  
 Thailand Malaysia Indonesia The Philippines 
Factory investment 4 3 5 * 
Technology investment * * 2 * 
 Source: ASEAN Brochures published by the JAMA, refer to  
http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html (2015/9/10) 
According to Table 7, Japan 
invested mostly in Thailand and 
Indonesia than others. In addition, most 
of Japan’s new investments were in 
Indonesia. However, Thailand had a 
larger workforce compared with 
Indonesia. Japan invested more in 
automotive parts factories in Thailand 
than in Indonesia. Furthermore, 
Thailand did not have strict rules for 
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setting up franchises, which is why 
Japanese MNCs were willing to 
establish R&D centers in Thailand. 
Malaysia followed protectionism and 
restricted franchises operated by foreign 
investors. The Philippines attracted only 
a small amount of foreign investment, 
and its industry was small; after 1997, 
the Philippines had almost stopped 
developing the automotive industry. 
Therefore, Thailand attracted most 
Japanese investors, and Indonesia 
displayed potential for developing its 
automobile industry.     
 
Table 7 Japanese investments in ASEAN automobile industries  
Unit: number of companies  
Source: Driving Growth Towards the Future 2015 published by JAMA, refer to 
HTTP://www.jama-english.jp/Asia/publications/pamphlets/hand_in_hand_2015.pdf（2015/9/1） 
 
During the Sukarno period, the 
assets of foreign investors were 
confiscated, and industrial policies were 
frequently changed; accordingly, 
foreign investors were indecisive in 
investment injection. Although 
Indonesia’s automobile industry 
appears promising and may even be 
superior to that in Thailand, the level of 
technology in Indonesia lags that in 
Thailand and Malaysia (Soejachmoen 
2011, p. 19). 
Rethink Industry Development 
Theory 
DiMaggio and Walter indicated 
that because of the uncertainty in global 
competition, convergence among  
 
organizations increases 
spontaneously(DiMaggio and Walter 
1983, 147-160). The question is whether 
this view can be applied to the 
automobile industry in the four ASEAN 
countries examined in this paper.   
Theoretically, the motivation of 
East Asian countries to industrialize 
came from their industrial development 
under their national crises following 
World War II. The East Asian countries 
formed an alliance with foreign 
investors and entered international 
markets; in addition, East Asian 
countries promoted their industrial 
policies and upgraded their industries 
(Chu 2000). Compared with East Asian 
countries, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Item Manufactur
ing and sale 
Part
s 
R&
D 
The 
number 
of 
investme
nt events 
Holdin
g more 
than 
50% of 
shares 
The 
number 
of 
employe
es 
Investmen
ts after 
1997 
Characteristi
cs 
Thailand 14 8 3 25 17 87,174 7 Foreign 
investors 
had 
dominance 
Malaysia 13 1 1 15 4 24,767 5 Limited 
dominance 
Indonesia 18 6 1 25 10 54,336 13 Concentrate
d after 1997 
The 
Philippine
s 
9 4 0 13 6 7,529 1 Almost no 
new plan 
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Malaysia, and the Philippines were in a 
challenging situation, both politically 
and economically. The question is 
whether a new development theory for 
emerging countries can be constructed 
under the framework of globalization 
and on the basis of the experiences of 
these four ASEAN countries in 
developing their automobile industries 
according to the neoclassical economics 
and development school. 
First, according to neoclassical 
economics, developing countries 
identify their suitable products under 
the market mechanism of international 
specialization; the role of a country has 
become insignificant. Neither 
developed nor developing countries 
have been withdrawn from intense 
global competition. Under the 
framework of globalization, industrial 
development can be categorized as a 
liberal market economy or coordinated 
market economy orientation. For liberal 
market economies, market mechanisms 
are crucial, and the government does 
not intervene to solve market problems; 
for a coordinated market economy, 
government offices utilize various 
relations and networks to solve market 
problems (Soskice 1999, 101-134). 
Theoretically, coordinated market 
economies satisfy the requirements of 
industrial development in emerging 
countries because developed countries 
rely on MNCs to participate in global 
industrial specialization; in developing 
countries, the government plays a 
crucial role in industrial development. 
(Chu 2000) Researchers have referred to 
government-led economic development 
in developing countries and the reform 
of technological capabilities as national 
systems of innovation (Chang and 
Kozul 1994, 859-91; Nelson 1993). The 
reason for the success of Thailand’s 
automobile industry is the 
government’s role as a coordinator and 
system innovator. Relative to Thailand, 
Malaysia, which adopted the 
protectionist approach, must develop a 
coordinated market economy between 
liberalization and coordination.         
Second, in the era of globalization, 
social systems of production are crucial. 
Industrial development is more than 
simply an economic activity—it also 
requires certain social conditions; in 
other words, social specialization is 
crucial for industrial development 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). Ruggie 
proposed ‚Embedded Liberalism‛ and 
indicated that in the era of globalization, 
governments must be connected with 
society and markets to become an 
industry facilitator (Ruggie 1982, pp. 
379-415). Dorner also indicated that in 
developing countries, stagnation of 
industrial innovation has been due to 
the influence of power and interests 
(Doner, Hicken and Ritchie 2009, pp. 
152). This view can explain the 
following phenomenon: Indonesia had 
a large domestic market and attracted 
considerable foreign investment in its 
automobile industry; however, 
government–business relations 
rendered Indonesia’s government 
unable to connect with society and 
markets. Conversely, society and 
markets in Thailand exerted distinct 
functions on the automobile industry. 
Therefore, to transform Indonesia’s 
automobile industry adjusting political 
and business structures is more crucial 
than formulating industrial policies. 
 Third, in the environment of 
globalization, MNCs in developed 
countries possess advanced technology. 
If developing countries do not 
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participate in the international market, 
they will not learn from more advanced 
markets. In addition, developing 
countries should not ignore the new 
technological nationalism. MNCs 
operating in developed countries play a 
critical role in facilitating market 
globalization.   
This is why Thailand is a 
successful example; however, Thailand 
has only positioned itself in the 
industrial-specialization system; the 
country’s automobile industry has 
neither established a domestic brand 
nor changed its position in the 
production system. Thailand is only a 
follower and thus continues to differ 
from developed countries. Because 
Thailand was never colonized, 
automotive businesses in Thailand are 
satisfied with current industrial 
developments. Under the new 
technological nationalism, Malaysia and 
Indonesia may experience difficulties in 
developing domestic brands and 
revitalizing their national economies. 
The Philippines, which did not adopt 
economic nationalism, practically 
positioned itself in the automotive parts 
market.20        
Fourth, Doner recently indicated 
that in the era of industrial revolution, 
the industrial transformation in 
developing countries depended on the 
desire of political leaders to promote 
innovation and related institutions and 
the structure of political arrangements 
(Doner, Hicken and Ritchie 2009, pp. 
151-171). In discussing ASEAN, Doner 
indicated that domestic political 
economy (particularly the political 
                                                 
20  Regarding ASEAN automotive parts 
trade, the Philippines was the only country 
that had a trade surplus. 
account of variation and domestic 
political pressures) determine the 
system and influence long-term 
strategies for developing automobile 
industries (Doner and Wad 2014, pp. 
664-687).  According to the present 
study, ‚the role of the state‛, 
‚government–business relations‛, and 
‚foreign investment‛ influenced the 
transformation of the automobile 
industry in these four ASEAN countries 
during the era of before globalization. 
Malaysia was limited by national 
protectionism, industrial specialization 
in Indonesia was influenced by the 
political and business structure, and the 
Philippines had to face the transfer of 
foreign investment; these limitations 
involved the political and economic 
interests of domestic initiators. 
This view accords with embedded 
liberalism proposed by Ruggie. Under 
the context of globalization, liberalized 
market economies are a common 
feature. However, economic 
development is typically embedded in 
the historical context of various 
countries, and the responses of a 
country promote industrial activity 
suitable for the political and economic 
system of the country (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). In other words, various 
industrial systems have been 
constructed according to different 
political and economic systems; some 
industrial systems have succeeded 
whereas others have failed.  
Finally, we discussed the ideal: the 
influence of the political economy on 
industrial intuition, as well as the 
influence of industrial institution on 
industrial activity. Although Thailand’s 
automobile industry is a successful case, 
it has only comparative advantages but 
cannot become a natural path or 
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transformation paradigm for other 
developing countries to imitate. In the 
international environment, different 
countries have their adjustment 
methods; thus, economic systems vary 
among countries. Thailand’s automobile 
industry has not achieved the 
Washington Consensus and has not 
been liberalized completely. Malaysia 
has adopted a state intervention 
strategy according to the development 
school of economics; however, this 
strategy was not a panacea for policy 
development. Developing countries 
have difficulties in identifying best 
practices regarding policy. 
Conclusion 
In the late 1990s, the financial crisis and 
globalization had a substantial 
influenced on Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines. In this 
study, we compared the automobile 
industries of these four ASEAN 
countries and found that their 
automobile industries feature the 
following characteristics.     
 (1) Thailand was the most willing 
to cooperate with foreign 
investors for industrial 
specialization, and its 
industrial goal was clearest; 
political and business factors 
had no influence on its 
industrial development; its 
export demand was greater 
than domestic; in addition, 
Thailand gained most benefits 
under globalization in the 
AEC.  
 (2) Malaysia considered the 
automobile industry as a 
national industry; however, 
because of domestic political 
and economic structures, 
Malaysia emphasized the 
importance of national 
interests instead of market 
development. The powerful 
government that led 
industrial developments did 
not pay adequate attention to 
globalization and AEC 
regional integration.     
 (3) Previously, Indonesia’s 
automobile industry was the 
exclusive domain of state 
leaders; Indonesia lacked a 
favorable industrial 
foundation, automotive parts 
industry, and clear 
development goals, and its 
market was prematurely 
liberalized. In recent years, 
foreign investors have 
favored Indonesia’s domestic 
market; accordingly, similar 
to Thailand; Indonesia has 
liberalized its market. The 
automobile industry in 
Indonesia appeared to be 
thriving, and Indonesia 
intended to establish national 
car brands; however, because 
of domestic political economy 
structures, the country’s 
production technology 
required improvement and 
industrial supply chains 
needed to be established.      
 (4) Although the Philippines 
intended to develop its 
automobile industry, the 
country was limited by 
long-term import substitution 
and had no clear industrial 
goals. Therefore, the 
Philippines was unsuccessful 
in developing its automobile 
54  The Political Economy of the Automobile Industry 
 
industry. In addition, regional 
integration forced foreign 
assembly factories to 
withdraw from the 
Philippines; consequently, the 
Philippines became an import 
market. In recent years, the 
Philippines have become 
exporters of automotive parts, 
and favorable outcomes have 
been reported.  
Table 8 The political economy and the automobile industries in ASEAN 
 
Industrial 
features 
Political 
economy 
characteristics 
The role of 
the state 
Government-business 
relations 
The role of 
foreign 
investors 
Globalization 
and 
adjustment 
Thailand 
Asia’s 
Detroit; 
Export 
demand was 
greater than 
domestic 
demand 
Lack of a 
powerful 
government 
Liberalization 
and 
adjustment 
Unapparent in the 
automobile industry 
Motivating 
job 
specialization 
Gradual 
participation 
Malaysia 
The only 
domestic 
brand 
Ethnic 
Politics 
Leading the 
industry 
Ethnic preference 
Selective 
cooperation 
Delayed 
participation 
Indonesia 
The 
domestic 
market was 
valued. 
The interests 
of powerful 
leaders led 
political and 
economic 
development 
No 
consistency  
Relations and licenses 
Nontechnical 
specialization 
Forced to 
participate 
(IMF 
conditions) 
The 
Philippines 
Specialized 
in 
automotive 
parts 
Long-term 
import 
substitution 
No clear 
goals 
Hindering 
industrialization 
Withdrawal 
from the 
market 
Gradual 
participation 
 
Table 8 summarizes the 
characteristics in the four ASEAN 
countries. Globalization resulted in 
similar economic developments in 
many countries; however, industrial 
developments have varied among 
countries. Industrial developments have 
been influenced by the political 
economy characteristics of various 
countries. Despite various political 
economy considerations and difficulties, 
these four ASEAN countries continue to 
develop their automobile industries. 
When conducting this research, we 
found that researchers should look 
beyond convergence theory or ‚learning 
from someone.‛ (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
36-44) As indicated by the renowned 
economist János Kornai, 
‚transformation‛ does not mean that 
the economic system changes from a 
controlled economy to a market 
economy; various economic systems can 
be explained by comparing these 
economic systems.  
In other words, the characteristics 
of economic systems can be understood 
through comparing the attributes of 
different systems(Kornai 1998). In the 
present comparison case, the political 
economy system determined the 
industrial development of ASEAN 
countries. In other words, researchers 
should look beyond convergence theory 
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and consider the political economy 
characteristics of different countries. 
Through comparative research, 
researchers can clarify the differences in 
systems and policies among various 
countries, which is why we conducted 
this comparative study 
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